Bart Streumer


I'm a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. My main research interest is metaethics.

My CV.

My University page.



In my recent book Unbelievable Errors, I defend an error theory about all normative judgements, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that this makes the theory more likely to be true.

The book on OUP's website.

Post on the OUP blog.

Post on the Imperfect Cognitions blog.

Interview with Robert Talisse for the New Books in Philosophy podcast.

Review by Robert C. Koons, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

Review by Hallvard Lillehammer, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.

Book note by Stephen Ingram, Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

Other publications

Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory. In Diego Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. Routledge, 2017.

The Unbelievable Truth about Morality. In Lenny Clapp (ed.), Philosophy For Us. Cognella, 2017. (Written for students.)

No, We Cannot. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2016): 537-546 (published version available here).

Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either (part of a symposium on Jonas Olson's book Moral Error Theory). Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2016): 419-436 (published version available here).

Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths? (with Daan Evers). Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, March 2016.

Can We Believe the Error Theory? Journal of Philosophy 110 (2013): 194-212 (published version available here).

Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World? Ratio 26 (2013): 450-470 (published version available here). Also in Bart Streumer (ed.), Irrealism in Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell, 2014.

Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties. In David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker and Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press, 2013 (published version available here).

Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties? Philosophical Studies 154 (2011): 325-348 (published version available here).

Reasons, Impossibility and Efficient Steps: Reply to Heuer. Philosophical Studies 151 (2010): 79-86 (published version available here).

Practical Reasoning. In Timothy O'Connor and Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010 (published version available here).

Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 537-561 (published version available here).

Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 1-29 (published version available here).

Reasons and Entailment. Erkenntnis 66 (2007): 353-374 (published version available here).

Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 136 (2007): 351-384 (published version available here).

Semi-Global Consequentialism and Blameless Wrongdoing: Reply to Brown. Utilitas 17 (2005): 226-30 (published version available here).

Procedural and Substantive Practical Rationality (with Brad Hooker). In Alfred Mele and Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford University Press, 2004 (published version available here).

Does 'Ought' Conversationally Implicate 'Can'? European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003): 219-28 (published version available here).

Can Consequentialism Cover Everything? Utilitas 15 (2003): 237-47 (published version available here).


I'm teaching the following courses in 2018-19:

Introduction to Ethics (first year)

Freedom and Responsiblity (third year)

Core Issues: Nihilism (master)

Research in Practice 2 (master, with Lodi Nauta)