I'm a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. My main research interest is metaethics.
My University page.
In my recent book Unbelievable Errors, I defend an error theory about all normative judgements, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that this makes the theory more likely to be true.
The book is available in OUP's holiday sale here.
Post on the OUP blog.
Post on the Imperfect Cognitions blog.
Interview with Robert Talisse for the New Books in Philosophy podcast.
Review by Robert C. Koons, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
Review by Hallvard Lillehammer, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
Book note by Stephen Ingram, Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Critical notice by N.G. Laskowski, Analysis.
I Ought to Reply, So I Can. Forthcoming in Philosophia.
Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory. In Diego Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. Routledge, 2017.
The Unbelievable Truth about Morality. In Lenny Clapp (ed.), Philosophy For Us. Cognella, 2017 (written for students).
Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either. Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2016): 419-436 (published version).
Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths? (with Daan Evers). Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, March 2016.
Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World? Ratio 26 (2013): 450-470 (published version). Also in Bart Streumer (ed.), Irrealism in Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell, 2014.
Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties. In David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker and Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press, 2013 (published version ).
Reasons, Impossibility and Efficient Steps: Reply to Heuer. Philosophical Studies 151 (2010): 79-86 (published version).
Semi-Global Consequentialism and Blameless Wrongdoing: Reply to Brown. Utilitas 17 (2005): 226-30 (published version).
I'm teaching the following courses in 2018-19: