Bart Streumer


 

I'm a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. I previously taught at the University of Reading in the UK, and before that I was a research fellow at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, UK. My main research interest is metaethics.

My CV.

My University page.

Email: b.streumer@rug.nl.
 

Book

In my book Unbelievable Errors I defend an error theory about all normative judgements, I argue that we cannot believe this theory, and I argue that this makes the theory more likely to be true.

The book on OUP's website.

Blog posts for the OUP blog, the Imperfect Cognitions blog, and the Institute of Art and Ideas.

Interview with Robert Talisse for the New Books in Philosophy podcast.

Reviews in Ethics, Analysis, Philosophy, the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, and Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

Symposium in the International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:

Symposium in the Journal of Moral Philosophy:

Papers

Why Formal Objections to the Error Theory Fail (with Daniel Wodak). Analysis 81 (2021): 254-262.

I Ought to Reply, So I Can. Philosophia 47 (2019): 1547-1554.

Reasons and Ability. In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press, 2018 (published version).

Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory. In Diego Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. Routledge, 2017.

No, We Cannot. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2016): 537-546 (published version).

Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either. Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (2016): 419-436 (published version).

Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths? (with Daan Evers). Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, March 2016.

Can We Believe the Error Theory? Journal of Philosophy 110 (2013): 194-212 (published version).

Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World? Ratio 26 (2013): 450-470 (published version). Also in Bart Streumer (ed.), Irrealism in Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell, 2014.

Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties. In David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker and Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press, 2013 (published version).

Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties? Philosophical Studies 154 (2011): 325-348 (published version).

Reasons, Impossibility and Efficient Steps: Reply to Heuer. Philosophical Studies 151 (2010): 79-86 (published version).

Practical Reasoning. In Timothy O'Connor and Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010 (published version).

Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 537-561 (published version).

Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 1-29 (published version).

Reasons and Entailment. Erkenntnis 66 (2007): 353-374 (published version).

Reasons and Impossibility. Philosophical Studies 136 (2007): 351-384 (published version).

Semi-Global Consequentialism and Blameless Wrongdoing: Reply to Brown. Utilitas 17 (2005): 226-30 (published version).

Procedural and Substantive Practical Rationality (with Brad Hooker). In Alfred Mele and Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford University Press, 2004 (published version).

Does 'Ought' Conversationally Implicate 'Can'? European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003): 219-28 (published version).

Can Consequentialism Cover Everything? Utilitas 15 (2003): 237-47 (published version).
 

For students

Are There Moral Truths? (a brief overview of metaethics).

The Unbelievable Truth about Morality. In Lenny Clapp (ed.), Philosophy For Us. Cognella, 2017 (a brief overview of the error theory).
 

Teaching

I taught the following courses in 2020-21:

  • Introduction to Ethics (first year)
  • Metaethics (second year, with Daan Evers)
  • Core Issues: Nihilism (master)